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Abstract Flooding events can affect businesses close to rivers, lakes or coasts. This
paper provides an economic partial equilibrium model, which helps to understand the
optimal location choice for a firm in flood risk areas and its investment strategies.
How often, when and how much are firms willing to invest in flood risk protection
measures? We apply Impulse Control Theory and develop a continuation algorithm
to solve the model numerically. We find that, the higher the flood risk and the more
the firm values the future, i.e. the more sustainable the firm plans, the more the firm
will invest in flood defense. Investments in productive capital follow a similar path.
Hence, planning in a sustainable way leads to economic growth. Sociohydrological
feedbacks are crucial for the location choice of the firm, whereas different economic
settings have an impact on investment strategies. If flood defense is already present,
e.g. built up by the government, firms move closer to the water and invest less in flood
defense, which allows firms to generate higher expected profits. Firms with a large
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initial productive capital surprisingly try not to keep their market advantage, but rather
reduce flood risk by reducing exposed productive capital.
Keywords Optimal investment · Location choice · Flood · Socio-hydrology · Impulse
control theory · Sustainability
1 Introduction
Climate change puts increasing environmental pressure on coastal zones (Turner et al.
1996) and on areas around lakes and rivers Vr¨ösmarty et al. (2000). On top of the list
of potential impacts of climate change are effects of sea level rise on coastal cities and
effects of extreme events on built infrastructure like floods from heavy precipitation
events (Hunt and Watkiss 2011). Floods and other extreme weather events increase
economic losses (Easterling et al. 2000). Large-scale flood disasters from recent years
have gained attention among decision makers (e.g. businesses). Implementing actions
to reduce disaster risks and build flood resilience facing limited resource needs decision
support tools (Mechler et al. 2014).
River and Coastal engineers develop risk-analysis techniques for high-level plan-
ning and detailed designs using simulation models (Sayers et al. 2002). Economic
approaches are cost-effectiveness analyses, multi-criteria analyses, robust-decision-
making approaches and dynamic programming (Zwaneveld and Verweij 2014;
Eijgenraam et al. 2012, 2014). The most popular tool is cost-benefit analysis applied to
cities (Lichfield 1960; Hunt and Watkiss 2011), regions, and countries [e.g. Jonkman
et al. (2004)].
There is a number of methods to control floods. Coastal defenses can be e.g. sea
walls, beach nourishment, barrier islands or tide gates in conjunction with dykes and
culverts. Next to rivers one can construct levees, lakes, dams, reservoirs, bunds, weirs
or retention ponds to hold extra water during floods. Moreover, floodways, water gates,
diversion channels, temporary barriers or a property level protection can be built. Often
flood control measures significantly change the environment and also influence the
water system. E.g. levees increase downstream flow and diversion channels redirect
water to another area. Both effects increase flood risk nearby. In addition, flood risk
increases due to the levee effect (Collenteur et al. 2015), i.e. people and businesses
feel save and move closer to the river, and exposed capital accumulates. Other flood
control systems like temporary perimeter barriers are not fool proof and can cause
unexpected flood damage (Wald 2011). Last, but not least, constructions can restrain
the function of a natural flood plain and therefore increase flood risk.
To sum up, installing flood control measures decreases flood risk, but the effect
can be significantly reduced when the flood control measure induces feedbacks on
the flood hazard or the exposed capital. We include this socio-hydrological feedback
mechanismn in our model and study its implications for the system dynamics.
Often investments in flood risk protection measures are done by the government.
In this paper we aim to identify the firm’s willingness to pay for flood protection.
Furthermore, also actions to reduce flood risk can be taken at the firm-level (Johnson
and Priest 2008). Businesses can install their own prewarning systems, choose a more
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expensive but safer technology for building the production plant, adjust the production
process by using a safer construction technology or another type of machines. Last,
but not least, more expensive labour agreements attract better human resources.
While our focus is on the firm’s investment decisions we also investigate whether
and to which extend the firm level decisions are influenced by investments of the
government.
The aim of this paper is to understand investment decisions of firms and their impli-
cations on businesses in flood risk areas. Viglione et al. (2014) and Baldassarre and
Viglione (2013) developed a conceptual descriptive model to understand the feedbacks
of flood risk reduction (i.e. investments in flood defense and moving away from the
river) and flood damage from a societal perspective. Grames et al. (2016) introduced
an optimal decision framework to investigate the interaction of a society’s investment
in flood defense and productive capital. In this paper we consider a partial equilibrium
model and try to understand the firm’s investment decisions in its interrelations with
the hydrological system. The focus on a firm instead of the whole society allows to
specifically analyze a location choice together with the firm’s willingness to pay for
flood protection. In contrast to the decisions from a societal point of view, the focus
on the firm level also allows us to study the role of firm specific characteristics for the
decision process.
A representative firm can have multiple choices: First, it can choose the optimal
location for its production plant, second the optimal investment in capital used for
production and third, the optimal investment in flood risk reduction measures.
To implement this diverse decision framework our paper rests on three building
stones. One building stone consists of so-called capital accumulation models where
optimal control theory is applied to determine the firm’s optimal investment behavior
over time. This literature starts out with Eisner et al. (1963) and later contributions
include Davidson and Harris (1981), Barucci (1998) and Grass et al. (2012).
Another building stone are the impulse control models that consider e.g. dike height
optimization, see Chahim et al. (2013). Subject to a water level that increases over
time, the decision maker has to decide about the optimal timing and size of the increase
of the dike height in order to find an optimal balance between the costs associated
with dike height increases and the improved flood protection that results from a dike
height increase. This strand of literature abstracts from (firm) investments so that the
economic value of the protected land develops exogenously.
The Impulse Control Problem is solved using the impulse maximum principle
(Blaquière 1985; Rempala and Zabczyk 1988; Chahim et al. 2012). The general theory
of viscosity analysis and quasivariational inequalities [e.g. Barles (1985) and Farouq
et al. (2010)] is more consistent, in the sense that it allows more general state-
ments under less restrictive assumptions, covering as many specific cases as possible.
However, for the model in this paper the Impulse Maximum Principle seems quite
appropriate for an economic interpretation and its numerical calculation.
The underlying paper combines these two approaches, i.e. (impulse) investments
have to be undertaken to protect the firm from floods while at the same time the firm
establishes an optimal investment pattern that directly influences its economic value.
The third building stone is the optimal location choice for the firm’s production
plant (Fig. 1) additional to the investment decisions. This location choice is like the
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Fig. 1 The firm chooses where to build its production plant by choosing the distance to the water
choice of technology explained in Brito (2004). A location closer to the water is more
profitable in the sense that the water’s infrastructure (transportation, cooling) is easier
available and the site is more attractive for the labour force and consumers. But on the
other hand being closer to the river implies that the firm faces a larger risk of being
flooded.
In location theory Glatte (2015) defines three categories for site selection frame-
work conditions: technical and architectural, economic, and legal, whereas Goette
(1994) distinguishes between economic site conditions (sales potential, competitive
conditions, infrastructure and transportation costs, labor, monetary conditions), politi-
cal site conditions (tax legislation, environmental protection, institutional market entry
barriers, support of business, political risks), cultural site conditions (differences in
language, mentality, religion, and the lack of acceptancy of foreign companies), and
geographical site conditions (climate, topography).
Natural hazards are often missing in the site selection literature and the only quan-
titative methods are cost-benefit analysis or cost-effectivness analysis (Glatte 2015).
We introduce a conceptual framework where firms take economic and environmental
conditions into account which in turn are affected by the firm’s decisions.
The firm’s decisions are based on an optimization problem, where in a first step the
firm is controlling its investments. In a second step, the firm aims to find the optimal
location knowing that revenues and costs will depend on the location choice. The
firm can only choose its optimal location after having determined the set of optimal
investment strategies. The planning horizon is finite, but the firm also considers its
salvage value at the end of the planning period. Entrepreneurs do consider only a finite
life cycle of a firm. Family businesses may plan in longer terms.
For the firm’s profit maximization only costs are relevant, which can be transferred
to monetary values. Consequently, flood damage is measured by so-called direct tan-
gible costs (Merz et al. 2010). We assume the firm to be a production plant with a lot
of tangible capital. Direct flood damage reflects the costs of replacing damaged capital
(Veen and Logtmeijer 2005).
The aim of the paper is to understand the investment decisions of a representative
firm in a flood risk area. We want to identify how much, how often, and when a firm is
willing to invest in flood risk protection measures and what the optimal location choice
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is. Our qualitative model helps to understand feedback mechanisms between the firm’s
decisions and the hazard of flooding. In Sect. 2 we explain the general model and its
analytical solutions. After discussing the numerical solution of the benchmark model
in Sect. 3 we investigate the impact of sustainable planning, the economic situation
and the sociohydrological feedbacks in Sect. 4. Section 5 concludes the paper and
some detailed derivations are given in the Appendix.
2 General model
In this section we set out the general model of investment planning in a flood risk
area, setting up the Hamiltonian and Impulse Hamiltonian of the representative firm
and deriving necessary conditions for optimally determining flood protection and
productive investments. The location choice is done in a second step based on the set
of optimal decisions.
2.1 Flood impact
We model a firm located in a flood risk area. The expected flood water level above
bankfull
W (t) = W0 + ηt, (1)
is some initial water level W (0) = W0 and increases with η [cm/year] due to climate
change (Eijgenraam Carel 2016). Anthropogenic flood risk protection H(t), despite
decreasing flooding occurrences, may increase flood water levels and consequently
flood risk, because e.g. higher dikes make it more difficult for water to stream back
in the sea/river after land has been flooded. We model this like Grames et al. (2016)
and Viglione et al. (2014) by adding an additional amount of water due to man-
made flood risk protection measures ξH H(t). ξH is the sociohydrological parameter
describing the feedback of flood risk protection measures H(t) to flood risk. The
resulting flood intensity W (t)+ ξH H(t) can be alleviated by increasing the minimum
distance to water D0 by the amount D for the location of the firm’s production plant
in the floodplain with slope αD . Consequently, the flood impact in times of flooding
(W (t) + ξH H(t) > H(t)) is
FI (W (t), D, H(t)) = W (t) + ξH H(t)
αD(D0 + D) . (2)
If the flood impact FI (W (t), D, H(t)) exceeds the current height of flood protection
(e.g. dikes, levees) H(t), damage occurs. According to Chahim et al. (2013) the flood
probability PF (t) [1/year] is given by an initial probability P0 and increases for a higher
water level, but decreases with larger flood risk protection measures (i.e. dikes). This
leads to the following flooding probability given a scaling parameter αF [1/cm].
PF (D, H(t)) = P0 exp[αF (FI (W (t), D, H(t)) − H(t))] (3)
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Substituting Eqs. (1) and (2) into Eq. (3) yields Eq. (4), where the socio-hydrological
feedback is clearly visible: flooding will reduce the effectiveness of the flood protection
by a factor (1 − ξH
αD(D0+D) ).
PF (D, H(t)) = P0 exp
[
αF
(
W (0) + ηt
αD(D0 + D) −
(
1 − ξH
αD(D0 + D)
)
H(t)
)]
(4)
The relative flood damage in case of floods increases with higher flood impact FI (t)
and is expressed as the proportion F(W (t), D, H(t)) ∈ [0, 1] of destroyed capital
following Grames et al. (2016) and Viglione et al. (2014).
F(W (t), D, H(t)) = 1 − exp[−FI (W (t), D, H(t))] (5)
2.2 Firm’s expected profit
The firm faces a competitive market and produces output Y (t) choosing the production
factors capital K (t) and the distance D to a river or coast in the sense that living closer
to the water yields advantages for transport, lowers costs of transporting water to
households and industry and is attractive for employees (see Viglione et al. (2014)).
The effect of D on output is similar to a technological parameter as it scales the firm’s
output level for a given set of the other production factors [e.g. Brito (2004)]. We
assume a minimum necessary distance to the water body D0. The production function
has a Cobb-Douglas form and reads
Y (K (t), D) = 1
D0 + D K (t)
α (6)
with α ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that the firm can sell all its output Y (t) for a price p
normalized to 1.
The firm invests IK (t) in its physical capital which depreciates with rate δK ∈ [0, 1].
K˙ (t) = IK (t) − δK K (t) (7)
The costs for capital investment are αK IK (t)2 with αK as a constant scaling parameter.
The value of flood damage is the sum of costs for repairs and cleanup, and costs
for lost revenue due to business interruption. First, we assume that repair costs
CF (K (t), F(t)) are just as high as the damaged physical capital stock, depending
on the impact of flooding F(t) ∈ [0, 1].
CF (K (t), F(t)) = F(t)K (t) (8)
Second, the lost revenue due to business interruption is equal to PF (D, H(t))
Y (K (t), D). Hence, revenue times probability that no flood occurs reads
[1 − PF (D, H(t))]Y (K (t), D). (9)
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We assume that everything is repaired immediately after the flooding and production
continues with the same capital stock K (t) and level of flood protection H(t) after
any flooding. Veen and Logtmeijer (2005), Leiter et al. (2009) and Parkatti (2013) are
using a similar approach.
To sum up, we can express the expected profit as the difference between expected
revenue and expected costs, i.e. investment and damage costs.
πe(K (t), D, H(t), IK (t)) = (1 − PF (D, H(t)))
[
Y (K (t), D) − αK IK (t)2
]
−PF (D, H(t))CF (K (t), F(t)) (10)
2.3 Impulse investments in flood defense
Additionally to investments in capital stock K , the firm can invest in flood risk pro-
tection at the expense of costs IH (ui , H(t)) to add an amount ui > 0 to their flood
protection H(t) at specific points in time t = τi . Therefore the firm chooses the opti-
mal number N ≥ 0 of investments, the optimal timing τi (i ∈ {1, .., N }) and the
optimal amount ui > 0 (i ∈ {1, .., N }).
H(τ+i ) = H(τ−i ) + ui (11)
holds for i ∈ {1, .., N }. Here H(τ−i ) is the level of flood risk protection before and
H(τ+i ) the level of flood risk protection after the i th investment.
We model exponential investment costs in flood defense capital following Eijgen-
raam Carel (2016) with positive constants θ1, θ2 and θ3.
IH (u, H(τ−)) =
{
(θ1 + θ2u) exp(θ3(H(τ−) + u)) if u > 0
0 if u = 0 (12)
For time t /∈ {τ1, ..., τN } the flood risk protection capital does not change.
H˙(t) = 0 (13)
The firm can invest in flood defense capital during a finite planning period [0, T ].
The total expected profit considering all types of costs can be displayed as follows
using the interest rate r to discount future values.
∫ T
0
πe(K (τ ), D, H(τ ), IK (τ ))e−rτ dτ −
N∑
i=1
IH (ui , H(τi ))e−rτi (14)
The value of the firm at the end of the planning horizon T is the difference
between expected remaining capital [1 − PF (D, H(T ))]K (T ) and expected damage
PF (D, H(T ))F(D, H(T ))K (T ).
V (K (T ), D, H(T )) = [1 − PF (D, H(T ))]K (T )
−PF (D, H(T ))F(D, H(T ))K (T ) (15)
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To model not only the expected profit during the planning period we additionally
consider the expected value V (K (T ), D, H(T )) of the firm after the planning period.
Therefore we use the so-called salvage value (Chahim et al. 2013). Note, that the firm
does not make any new decisions after the planning period.∫ ∞
T
V (K (T ), D, H(T ))e−r t dt = 1
r
e−rT V (K (T ), D, H(T )) (16)
2.4 The firm’s optimal decisions
The firm maximizes accumulated discounted profit given an interest rate r within
a finite planning time horizon expecting floods at unknown times. As a first step it
solves the problem for a given value of D. It can choose the number N of flood defense
investments to increase flood risk protection measures by ui > 0 and its timings τi
during the finite planning period [0, T ]. It also controls the investment in physical
capital IK (t) > 0 during the planning period and takes into account the salvage value
V (K (T ), D, H(T )) weighted with a time preference δS .
max{ui ,τi ,N ,IK (t)}
∫ T
0
πe(K (τ ), D, H(τ ), IK (τ ))e−rτ dτ
−
N∑
i=1
IH (ui , H(τi ))e−rτi + δS 1
r
e−rT V (K (T ), D, H(T )) (17a)
To summarize, the dynamics of the state variables K (t) and H(t) are
K˙ (t) = IK (t) − δK K (t) (17b)
H˙(t) = 0 for t /∈ {τ1, ..., τN } (17c)
H(τ+i ) = H(τ−i ) + ui for i ∈ {1, ..., N } (17d)
and their initial values are K (0) = K0 and H(0−) = 0.
As a second step, the firm chooses the optimal location (D) for its production plant
given the solutions of problem (17a).
We follow the work from Chahim et al. (2012) to derive the necessary optimality
conditions for our maximization problem by applying the Impulse Control Maximum
Principle (see Appendix B). This way we obtain the optimal paths of the decision
variables and the costates. We will describe the intuition and for the detailed results
refer to the Appendix A.
The optimal capital investment is as such that the expected revenue stream, including
the increase in the salvage value, equals the expected marginal costs. If the production
is capital intense, the firm invests intensively in its production capital but slows the
investments down with an increasing stock of physical capital, i.e. an extra unit of
physical capital is more valuable if the capital stock is (still) small. However, when
the expected damage rate is high, the firm will invest less in physical capital. The
investment behaviour does not change much if the expected damage rate (possibly
amplified by a high water level) is high, but is very sensitive to small changes of low
expected damage rates.
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A high current and long term value of the physical capital due to a high shadow
price and high interest rates motivates the firm to invest in its physical capital, whereas
higher investment costs decelerate the accumulation of physical capital. Nonetheless,
the firm wants to sustain its capital stock and invests more if the depreciation rate is
higher.
The shadow price for physical capital at the end of the planning period equals the
difference of the discounted marginal expected output and the expected damage rate.
For investment in flood defense we derive the optimal timing and the amount of
investments. For these decisions the shadow price of flood defense capital is crucial.
Whenever the benefits of investing in flood defense (i.e. increase in shadow price
and expected profit) exceed the costs, the firm will invest in flood risk measures. The
amount of investment will be higher if the previous level of flood defense is low and
the shadow price of the increased flood defense capital is high. Moreover investment
increases if investment costs are low. Still, the cost structure is important: Significantly
lower fixed costs could increase the number of investments and therefore decrease the
investment amount.
The shadow price for flood defense capital at the end of the planning period is the
expected loss from flooding, i.e. the sum of the revenue due to business interruption, the
avoided costs at the time of the flood, and the direct damage described by value of repair
and cleanup costs. The net present value of the shadow price for flood defense capital
increases with expected future loss (i.e. lost profit and damaged capital) augmented
with stronger sociohydrological feedbacks and a closer distance to the water. Contrary,
if the expected sustained capital at the end of the planning period is high the value
decreases.
The number of impulse investments into flood defense capital is rather small (i.e. less
than four investments in a feasible planning period) due to fixed costs. Furthermore,
the first investment in flood defense is usually early to ensure a low flood hazard for
the location of the production plant.
Last, but not least, we find that the optimal level of flood defense can never exceed
an upper bound H¯ . Still, this level depends on the propertis of the firm like production
capacities and existing capital stock. The upper bound will be lower if the firm locates
further away from the river, the sociohydrological feedbacks are small and the initial
flooding probability is low.
3 Benchmark model
In this section we show the numerical solution of the model and discuss its economic
intuition. To derive numerical solutions for our impulse control problem we apply the
(multipoint) boundary value approach (Grass 2017). The idea is to solve a boundary
value problem (BVP) based on the system dynamics given by the canonical system and
update the according boundary conditions at impulse times. A continuation technique
is used to continue and find solutions with different number of impulses. The objective
values of such solutions are compared and the optimal solution is chosen. Moreover,
the continuation alogrithm allows to continue a solution for every model data. Details
about the numerical method, which was developed to solve such types of problems,
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are described in Grass (2017). Details about the application of the numerical method
to our proposed model are found in Appendix C. First, we derive the optimal solution
for investments depending on the distance D. Second, we plot the objective function
evaluated at the optimal investment as a function of D and locate the maximum with
respect to D.
We use the following initial conditions. The mean water level above bankfull as
well as the flood protection are normalized to zero at the beginning of the planning
period. The productive capital initially available for the firm is 108 $. The initial
flooding probability is 0.001 per year according to Chahim et al. (2013). D is referred
to a length measure, but scale free. Still, we can exemplify the minimum distance to
the water with 5m. All the variables and their initial conditions are listed in Table 1.
The parameters are displayed in Table 2. Many parameters (r , A, α, αK , δK ) are
chosen according to standard economic literature, and other parameters (τk , αP ) are
scaling factors. Most hydrology parameters ξH , αD , αF are defined in Viglione et al.
(2014). Investment costs in flood protection θ1, θ2, θ2 and natural water level rise η
are introduced in e.g. Chahim et al. (2013) and Eijgenraam Carel (2016). We choose
a shorter planning horizon T than (Chahim et al. 2013) to reflect a feasible life cycle
time of a firm (Lumpkin and Dess 2001). The time discount of the salvage value δS
is given by (1 + δL)T = 1 + δS , where δL denotes a standard yearly time preference
rate. Note, r represents the interest rate of the capital market and is not necessarily
equal to the individual time preference rate δL .
In addition to the the benchmark values we have also listed the values for sensitivity
analysis described in the next sections. Note, that our numerical calculations are aimed
to provide a qualitative analysis to understand feedbacks and mechanisms within a
sociohydrological model of floodings.
The optimal solution is to locate the firm’s production plant rather close to the
water (Fig. 4) and to make two impulse investments in flood risk protection measures
(Fig. 2b). The dynamics of the capital K and the flood defense H are displayed in
Fig. 2. The first jump occurs very early so that the risk of flooding is very small
and the firm can invest in its capital to gain high expected revenues. Since flood risk
is increasing with time (Eq. 1) the firm’s investments (Fig. 3) decrease as well. We
observe an anticipation effect of the firm, since capital investment increases shortly
before the second impulse investment. At the time of an impulse investment IH the
continuous investment IK jumps too.
The second impulse investment is in the last third of the planning period and just
as high as the upper bound H¯ derived in Eq. (27).
Investments in flood risk protection measures increase economic activity. We can
identify that whenever the firm feels saver, it invests more. This is a positive feedback
loop and leads to sustainable economic growth, because the firm’s capital is high and
flood risk is low.
Moving closer to the water increases production output, but also increases flood
risk. Depending on which effect dominates, the expected profit either increases to the
left of the peak or decreases to the right of the peak. One can identify this interesting
trade-off in Fig. 4, where we find the optimal location of the firm’s production plant
(D) at the peak of the value function V ∗ of problem set Eq. (17a).
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Table 1 Variables of the model
Variable Interpretation Unit
t Time [year]
K (t) Productive capital 106 $
D Firm’s distance to water 102[m]
ui Height of i th increase in flood protection measures [cm]
H(t) Level of flood protection [cm]
τi Timing of i th investment in flood defense [year]
N Number of investments i [ ]
IH (t) Costs for investment in H(t) 106 $
πe(t) Firm’s expected profit 106 $
Y (t) Firm’s output 106 $
IK (t) Investment in physical capital 106 $
CF (t) Total costs of flooding 106 $
W (t) Water level [cm]
F(T ) Proportion of flooding damage [0,1]
FI (T ) Flood impact []
PF (t) Flooding probability [1/year]
λK (t) Shadow price of physical capital 106 $
λH (t) Shadow price of flood protection 106 $
Initial values Interpretation Unit Value case
W0 Initial water level [cm] 0
K0 Initial productive capital 106 $ 100 500
H0 Initial flood protection [cm] 0 200
P0 Initial flooding probability [1/year] 0.001
It is optimal to make two impulse investments (Fig. 4). Investing more often is
always slightly worse, because fixed costs occur more often. Investing in flood defense
only once or even never would only be better if the firm was located closer to the river,
but the objective value would decrease. This would imply that the production output
is higher in the beginning and the expected profit much less at the end of the planning
horizon because flood risk is increasing dramatically. This also leads to a lower salvage
value at the end of the planning horizon.
4 Alternative scenarios
In this section we discuss the optimal investment decisions from the perspective of
sustainability, the economic setting and the socio-hydrological feedbacks. The firm
has three options to adapt to different situations. Firstly, it can choose the number and
amount of investment in flood risk protection measures. Secondly, it can choose the
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Table 2 Parameters of the model and their units of measurement
Parameter Interpretation Unit Base case Case study
D0 Minimal distance to water 102[m] 0.05
T End time of planning period [year] 100 50,150
r Interest rate [1/year] 0.03
A Technology [ ] 1
α Output elasticity of physical capital [0,1] 0.3
αK Scale for expected investment in
K (t)
[ ] 0.01
τK Scale for deterministic investment in
K (t)
[ ] 0.01
δK Depreciation rate of K (t) [1/year] 0.05
θ1 Fixed costs for investing in H(t) 106 $ 100
θ2 Linear costs for investing in H(t) 106 $/cm 0.5
θ3 Exponential costs for investing in
H(t)
[ln(106 $)/cm] 0.005
θ˜1 Transformed fixed costs for investing
in H(t)
106 $ θ2 + θ1θ3
θ˜2 Transformed linear costs for
investing in H(t)
106 $ θ2θ3
η Increase of water level per year [cm/year] 0.5
ξH Additional rise of the water level due
to existing defense capital
[ ] 0.3 0, 0.5
αD Scale of the slope of the floodplain [ ] 10
αF Scaling of flooding probability [1/cm] 0.05
δS Time discount of salvage value [0,1] 0.1 0, 0.25
αP Approximation parameter for
flooding probability
[] 100
Fig. 2 State dynamics in the planning period [0, T ]. Firm’s capital K (a) increases only when the flood
risk is low as a result of a high flood risk protection standard (b)
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Fig. 3 Capital investment IK
Fig. 4 Solution structure given by the objective value V ∗ depending on D for no impulse investments
(grey), one impulse investment (black), two impulse investments (blue) and three impulse investments
(green). Note, that the objective values do not exist for every value of D for each case (color figure online)
investment strategy in its capital within the planning period. Thirdly, it can choose the
location for its production plant.
We will compare the different scenarios to the benchmark model to understand
which option is most suitable to adapt optimal investment decisions for a different
hydrological and economic setting.
4.1 The role of sustainability
Two parameters reflect how important sustainability is for the decision making firm.
On the one hand, the salvage value at the end of the planning period is weighted with a
certain time preference rate δS . On the other hand, the planning horizon T is important
for the investment decisions. We will discuss both options in detail.
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Fig. 5 State dynamics for δS = 0 (dashed blue line), δS = 0.1 (dotted dark blue line) and δS = 0.25 (solid
light blue line) in the planning period [0, T ]. If the salvage value of the firm is important (a) firm’s capital
K increases towards the end of the planning horizon and (b) firms invest higher amounts and more often in
flood risk protection measures
If the value of the firm at the end of the planning period is important (δS > 0),
firms care about flood risk protection measures in the long run and its net present
value is significantly higher. The optimal location of the firm’s production plant is at
an increased distance to the water body. But the more crucial impact is the investment
behavior towards the end of the planning horizon. Fig. 5 shows the time paths of the
firm’s capital K and the flood defense H for different time preference parameters δS .
The investment behavior in the beginning is rather similar, but for a higher δS the
firm invests much more in its productive capital at the end of the planning period.
Furthermore, the firm is willing to invest in flood defense more often.
Decision makers in firms with a high time preference rate δS can be e.g. fami-
lies, entrepreneurs who are confident about a long life time of their product(s) or
entrepreneurs who are able to adapt to a changing environment and market demand.
If the firm cannot be sold at the end (δS = 0) because its product will be outdated
and the firm cannot survive on the market anymore, it still invests once to protect itself
from floods but tries to make a lot of profits only in the short term. After some time
it will neither invest in its own capital (IK = 0) nor in flood defense. So the risk of
being flooded is much higher.
Even if a firm “only” cares about its own value it is willing to invest in flood risk
protection measures and increases economic activity. This is important for the whole
region.
Firms that do not expect to be on the market for a long time do not care (much)
about flood protection. Figure 6 shows the number of impulse investments and the net
present value of the firm for various planning horizons T .
If the planning period is only a few years firms do not invest in flood defense, and
the net present value V ∗ of the firm is also relatively low.
Firms with a planning horizon around thirty years are most valid. They optimally
invest once in flood protection after some years and not in the very beginning.
When a firm plans for more than seventy years it optimally invests (at least) twice
in flood defense, and the first investment is already very early. Moreover, Fig. 7b
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Fig. 6 Solution structure given by the objective value V ∗ depending on the planning horizon T for no
impulse investments (grey), one impulse investment (black), two impulse investments (blue) and three
impulse investments (green) (color figure online)
Fig. 7 State dynamics for planning horizon T = 50 (dashed dark green line), T = 100 (dotted blue line)
and T = 150 (solid light green line). If the planning horizon T is longer (a) firms invest more in capital K
even at the beginning and (b) firms invest higher amounts and more often in flood risk protection measures
shows that the early impulse investment with a planning horizon of 150 years doubles
the amount of impulse investment of a firm with a planning horizon of 50 years.
Additionally, firms with a longer planning horizon invest more in their capital already
at the beginning (see Fig. 7a).
The only disadvantage of investing a lot in flood defense is the necessity to save for
these investments and consequently invest less in the firm’s productive capital. This
could lead to a regression. Firms would be able to keep investing in their physical
capital if e.g. the state government built the flood defense.
To sum up, a sustainable planning process (longer planning horizon) of the firms
increases GDP already at the beginning and guarantees a safe environment.
123
J. Grames et al.
Fig. 8 State dynamics for different economic situations: benchmark model with H0 = 0 and K0 = 10
(dotted blue line), protected flood plain H0 = 200 (dashed red line), and capital intense firm K0 = 500
(solid orange line)
4.2 The economic situation
Depending on the economic situation firms choose different investment strategies. We
first analyze a firm in a region where flood protection already exists like e.g. in the
Netherlands. Secondly, we investigate the investment decisions of a firm with a high
initial capital stock. This can be a company building a production plant in a country
with lower prices or a firm with e.g. state subsidy for its company foundation.
Firms located in a flood risk area where flood protection measures are already
installed build their production plant closer to the water and invest in flood defense
much later (Fig. 8). Even though the investment behavior in productive capital is
similar to the benchmark model, the expected net present value of the firm is higher
because the firm plant is safer and closer to the water.
A firm with high initial productive capital (Fig. 8) does not invest more often in
flood protection, but it will invest earlier, i.e. already at t = 0 and even to a higher
extent because the firm has more to loose in case of a flood. Still, its location is only
slightly closer to the water. Surprisingly, instead of building extra flood defense, the
firm is reducing flood risk by decreasing productive capital K0 to the level in the
benchmark scenario. Consequently, the higher value of the firm (Fig. 9b) is only due
to higher expected profits at the beginning of the planning period caused by a higher
level of initial capital stock K0.
We compare the net present value of a firm depending on initial flood defense H0
and alternatively initial productive capital K0 (Fig. 9). In the first case, investment
behavior changes (i.e. for higher H0 less impulse investments are optimal). In the
second case, investment behavior does not change (i.e. it is always optimal to invest
twice in flood risk protection measures even if the firm could make a large one-time
investment at the beginning).
Not investing in flood risk protection measures (grey line in Fig. 9) becomes more
attractive for higher H0 because the firm is safer anyways, whereas for a higher produc-
tive capital K0 it is less profitable because the exposed capital is larger and therefore
possible flood damage is larger. Consequently, flood risk is decreasing for higher (ini-
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Fig. 9 The net present value V ∗ of the firm increases for higher initial capital stocks. The colors indicate
no impulse investments (grey), one impulse investment (black), two impulse investments (blue) and three
impulse investments (green) (color figure online)
tial) flood defense and increasing for higher (initial) productive capital, since flood
risk is defined as the product of flood hazard and exposed capital.
4.3 Sociohydrological feedbacks
Building flood risk protection measures often changes the environment and more
specifically the water system. This can cause negative feedbacks for investing in flood
defense like e.g. the levee effect or because after a flood it is more difficult for the
water to stream back into the river, thereby increasing flood damage. We investigate
the effect of these feedbacks on the investment decision of the firm for a scenario with
no feedback effects and a scenario with strong feedbacks.
If investment in flood protection affects the water system and increases flood risk,
the expected value of the firm decreases dramatically for three reasons: Firstly, firms
choose a location much farther away from the water to avoid these negative feedbacks.
Secondly, a firm invests less and less often in flood defense, because it increases damage
if a flood happens. Thirdly, since the firm is less safe and less profitable because it
is located farther away from the water, it will invest less in productive capital, which
again leads to a lower production output.
Figure 10 shows the value of the firm in case of no feedbacks (ξH = 0) and strong
feedbacks (ξH = 0.5). In case of no feedbacks the firm chooses a location much closer
to the river and invests three times in flood risk protection measures at almost equal
time intervals.
If the hydrological feedbacks are strong the firm builds its premises far away from
the water and the value of the firm would not change much if it invests more or less
often in flood defense. Still, it is optimal to invest twice. The first investment takes
place already after a few years and the second investment is rather at the end of the
planning horizon. Interestingly, the total amount of flood defense is almost as high as
in the benchmark model, even though the location is much farther away.
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Fig. 10 The net present value V ∗depending on D for no impulse investments (grey), one impulse investment
(black), two impulse investments (blue) and three impulse investments (green). For high feedbacks (ξH ) it
does not pay off to invest in flood defense and will be more profitable to build the production plant further
away from the water (color figure online)
We notice that it plays a crucial role if the flood risk protection affects the environ-
ment and consequently the water system which is the flood hazard for the firm. We
conclude that the damage effect of the flood protection level plays a crucial role in
affecting optimal firm behavior.
5 Conclusions
This paper provides the investment behaviour and location choice of a firm in a flood
risk area within an optimal decision framework. In a first step, the firm chooses timing,
number and amount of investments for impulse investments in flood risk protection
measures, together with investment in its productive capital within a finite planning
period. In a second step, the firm chooses the optimal location for its production plant
in the flood risk area.
We present analytical and numerical solutions and analyse variations of these solu-
tions under different parameterizations of the model. Sustainable investment planning
of the firm doees not lead only to a safer environment with less flood risk, but also to
economic growth both in the short and the long run. If the area is already protected
against floods, firms still invest in flood defense, but less. And if the firm is more
capital intensive potential damage is larger, but the timing and amount of impulse
investments do not change.
Anthropogenic flood risk reduction can affect the environment resulting in changes
of the water system and consequently again increase flood risk due to negative feed-
backs. In this case, production output is much less and the firm decides to build its
production far away from the water.
So far we have presented a qualitative numerical analysis of our model set up. It
would be interesting in further work to numerically calibrate our model with empirical
data from case studies.
Other topics of future research could be to introduce depreciation and maintenance
of flood risk protection measures or to simulate random flooding events (e.g. Poisson
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distribution) like Grames et al. (2016) or Viglione et al. (2014) and imply them like
shocks in the model of Kuhn et al. (2017).
Furthermore, our partial equilibrium setup reflecting the firm’s decisions could be
extended to a general equilibrium framework that also models both the household’s
behavior and government policies endogenously, in addition to the firm’s optimal
decisions. This allows for an analysis of the society as a whole given all the economic
interactions.
Last but not least one could apply the method of impulse control to the decision
framework of a social planner who represents the whole society and can include e.g.
environmental quality in their objective function.
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A Details of the firm’s optimal decisions
In addition to Sect. 2.4 we provide more detailed insights about the optimal decisions
of the firm. To still enable smooth reading we present the derivations of the optimal
decisions in Appendix B.
A.1 Optimal capital investment
The optimal dynamics of the investment in physical capital between the impulse invest-
ments is given by Eq. (18). The firm increases investments in physical capital if the
interest rate is high and the depreciation rate is high. If the expected output per phys-
ical capital is already high, the firm slows down investment, whereas investment is
increased for a higher capital stock or a higher shadow price of the capital stock. More-
over, the elasticity of physical capital in the production function has a negative impact
on the investment decision. Marginal investment increases if the expected damage rate
increases. Investment decreases if the water level rises.
I˙K (t) = IK (t)
[
r + δK − α
λK
(1 − PF (D, H(t)))Y (K (t), D)
K (t)
+ 1
λK
PF (D, H(t))F(D, H(t)) + αF
λK
PF (D, H(t))
1 − PF (D, H(t))
η
αD D
]
(18)
Solving the differential equation from the first order conditions and the transver-
sality condition yields the net present value for the expected optimal investment in
physical capital IK (t) at time t .
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(1 − PF (D, H(t)))IK (t) =
1
2αK
∫ T
t
α[1 − PF (D, H(s))]Y (K (s), D) − PF (D, H(s))F(D, H(s))K (s)
K (s)
e−(r+δk )(s−t)ds
+e−(r+δK )(T −t) 1
r
α
2αK
[1 − PF (D, H(T ))]Y (K (T ), D)K (T ) − PF (D, H(T ))F(D, H(T ))
(19)
Given lower investment costs (2αK ) the firm invests more in physical capital. Addi-
tionally, more expected output per capital in the future in a more capital intense
production (α) increases the investment. On the other hand, a higher expected damage
rate decreases the optimal investment. To conclude, expression (19) shows that the
productive investment rate is determined as such that the resulting expected revenue
stream, including the increase in the salvage value, due to a marginal investment,
equals the expected marginal investment costs.
At the end of the planning period T the optimal investment rate will be equal to the
difference between expected outcome per capital and expected damage per capital.
(1 − PF (D, H(T )))IK (T )
= 1
r
α
2αK
[1 − PF (D, H(T ))]Y (K (T ), D)K (T ) − PF (D, H(T ))F(D, H(T ))
(20)
A.2 Shadow prices
Analogous to the derivation of Eq. (19) we obtain the net present value of the shadow
price for investment in flood defense.
λH =
∫ T
t
(
PF (D, H(s))αF
(
1 − ξH
αD(D0 + D)
)
[Y (K (s), D)
−αK IK (s)2 − F(D, H(s))]
− PF (D, H(s))(1 − F(D, H(s)))
(
ξH
αD(D0 + D) )
)
er(t−s)ds
− er(t−T ) 1
r
PF (D, H(T ))αF
(
1 − ξH
αD(D0 + D)
)
[Y (K (T ), D)
−αK IK (T )2 − F(D, H(T ))]
− PF (D, H(T ))(1 − F(D, H(T )))
(
ξH
αD(D0 + D)
)
(21)
The shadow price of flood protection increases with expected future losses (i.e. lost
profit and damaged capital) and decreases with expected sustained capital. The shadow
price λH increases if sociohydrological feedbacks are more intense and if the firm
decided to build the production plant closer to the water.
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The transversality conditions Eq. (35) yield expressions for the shadow prices at
time T +.
λK (T +) = 1
r
α
[1 − PF (H(T +), D)]Y (K (T +), D)
K
− PF (H(T +), D)F(H(T +))
(22a)
λH (T +) = 1
r
PF (H(T +), D)
[
αF
(
1 − ξH
αD(D0 + D)
)
(Y (K (T +), D) − αK IK (T +)2
+F(H(T +), D)K (T +))
]
(22b)
The shadow price for physical capital at the end of the planning period (22a) equals
the discounted difference of expected output per capital and the expected damage rate.
The shadow price for flood defense capital at T + is the expected loss from flooding, i.e.
the sum of the revenue due to business interruption PF (H, D)Y (K , D), the avoided
costs at the time of the flooding −PF (H, D)(αK I 2K ) and the direct damage as the
value of repair and cleanup costs PF (H, D)F(H)K .
5.1 Optimal flood defense
Firms invest in flood defense when marginal costs equal marginal gain at the jump
point τi (ui > 0). This is shown by the first order impulse conditions
λH (τ
+
i ) =
∂ IH
∂u
(ui , H(τ−i )) = (θ˜1 + θ˜2ui ) exp(θ3(H(τ−) + ui )), (23)
where θ˜1 := θ2 + θ1θ3 and θ˜2 := θ2θ3, and the jumping condition,
λH (τ
+
i ) − λH (τ−i ) =
∂ IH
∂ H
(H(τ−i ), ui , λH (τ
+
i ), τi )
= (θ˜3 + θ˜2ui ) exp(θ3(H(τ−) + ui )), (24)
where θ˜3 := θ1θ3.
At the jump points, i.e. when the firm invests in flood protection, the increase in
expected profit should equal the investment costs or be higher at the initial point in
time provided the firm invests in flood protection at this time.
πe(K (τi ), D, H(τ+i ), IK (τ
+
i )) − πe(K (τi ), D, H(τ−i ), IK (τ−i ))
+λK (τ+i )[IK (τ+i ) − δK K (τ+i )] − λK (τ−i )[IK (τ−i ) − δK K (τ−i )]
−r IH (ui , H(τ−i )) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
> 0 if τi = 0
= 0 if τi ∈ (0, T )
< 0 if τi = T
(25)
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If we assume that for every planning horizon T there exists a unique optimal solution
for our problem (17a) with a finite number of jumps, we can derive the optimal impulse
control value ui (Grass and Chahim 2012).
With the necessary condition Eq. (23) we obtain an implicit function of the optimal
value ui at time τi .
H(τ−i ) + ui = − ln((θ˜1 + θ˜2ui )
1
θ3 ) + ln(λH (τ+i )
1
θ3 ) (26)
∂2 I Ham
∂u2
(ui , H(τ−i )) is always negative for u ≥ 0 and ensures that ui is optimal.
Furthermore, we are able to identify an upper bound H¯ for the level of flood defense
capital H given an optimal solution. The detailed derivation is found in Appendix 5.1.
H¯ = ln
( P0αF (Y+K )
rθ1θ3
) + αF W0+ηT +αD(D0+D)
θ3 + αF
(
1 − ξH
αD(D0+D)
) (27)
So we know H¯ > H(T +). Since the water level (1) is increasing it holds that H(T +) >
H(t) for all t ∈ [0, T ]. H¯ still depends on Y (K , D) and K , and can therefore vary for
different properties of the firm.
H¯ increases for a higher flood risk. A higher flood risk can be caused by a higher
flood hazard (PF (t)), i.e. the initial flooding probability P0 or the water level increases
or the firm is located closer to the water in a flatter flood plain. Defense capital will also
be higher if the damage resulting from a flood is higher, which is the case if exposed
capital (K (t)) is higher. Flood risk also increases if exposed capital increases. The
only parameter to lower H¯ are the costs of investments IH in flood defense.
B Additional derivations and explanations
B.1 Necessary Optimality Conditions
We follow the work from Chahim et al. (2012) to derive the necessary optimality
conditions for our maximization problem. We use the current value Hamiltonian form
to incorporate the discounting.
To apply the Impulse Control Maximum Principle the functions πe(t) and
IH (ui , H(t)) should be continuously differentiable in H and ui on R+, and 1r πe(T )
should be continuously differentiable in K (T ) and H(T ) on R+. Furthermore,
IH (ui , H(τ−)) should be continuous in τ .
The maximization problem displayed in Eq. (17a) yields the following current value
Hamiltonian
Ham(K , IK , λK , t) = πe(K (t), D, H(t), IK (t)) + λK [IK (t) − δK K (t)] (28)
and the following current value Impulse Hamiltonian.
I Ham(H, u, λH , t) = −IH (u, H(t)) + λH u (29)
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The necessary optimality conditions in our model are as follows. For all t /∈
{τ1, ..., τN } it holds that
∂ Ham
∂ IK
(K , IK , λK , t) = 0 (30)
∂ Ham
∂K
(K , IK , λK , t) = rλK − λ˙K (31a)
∂ Ham
∂ H
(K , IK , λK , t) = rλH − λ˙H (31b)
and for any u ≥ 0
∂ I Ham
∂u
(H, 0, λH , t)u ≤ 0. (32)
For the impulses t ∈ {τ1, ..., τN } and non-negative heightenings u ≥ 0 the following
holds.
∂ I Ham
∂u
(H(τ−i ), ui , λH (τ
+
i ), τi ) = 0 (33)
λH (τ
+
i ) − λH (τ−i ) = −
∂ I Ham
∂ H
(H(τ−i ), ui , λH (τ
+
i ), τi ) (34a)
λK (τ
+
i ) − λK (τ−i ) = −
∂ I Ham
∂K
(H(τ−i ), ui , λH (τ
+
i ), τi ) = 0 (34b)
At the end of the time interval the transversality conditions
λK (T +) = 1
r
∂πe
∂K
(K (T +), H(T +)) (35a)
λH (T +) = 1
r
∂πe
∂ H
(K (T +), H(T +)) (35b)
hold with K (T +) = K (T ) and H(T +) = H(T ) if there is no jump at time T and
τ1 < τ2 < · · · < τN ≤ T .
B.2 Derivation of equations for Sect. 2.4
From the condition (30) we obtain
λK = (1 − PF (D, H))2αK IK . (36)
Taking the logarithm and time derivative and combining them with the result from
(31a) leads to the following optimal dynamics of the investment in physical capital
between the impulse investments shown in (18).
123
J. Grames et al.
Solving the differential equation from condition (31a) for λK , using the transversal-
ity condition (22a) and Eq. (36) yields the net present value for the expected optimal
investment in physical capital IK (t) expressed in Eq. (19).
The necessary condition (31b) yields the dynamics of the shadow price for invest-
ment in flood defense capital.
λ˙H = rλH − PF (D, H)αF
(
1 − ξH
αD(D0 + D)
)
[Y (K , D) − αK I 2K − F(D, H)]
+PF (D, H)(1 − F(D, H))
(
ξH
αD(D0 + D)
)
(37)
We can solve that differential equation (37) using the transversality condition (22b) to
obtain Eq. (21).
B.3 Derivation of H¯
We know investment is only optimal if marginal gain (22b) is at least equal to marginal
costs (23) at time T + . The resulting equation
1
r
PF (D, H)
[
αF
(
1 − ξH
αD(D0 + D)
) [
Y − αK I 2K + F(D, H)K
]
− ξH
αD(D0 + D) [1 − F(D, H)]K
]
= (θ˜1 + θ˜2ui ) exp(θ3(H(τ−) + ui )) (38)
ensures that an upper bound H¯ exists, because the left hand / the right hand side
of the equation converges to 0 / ∞ for H → ∞, respectively. We define A :=
αF (1−ξH )Y +αF (1−ξH )F(D, H)K − ξHαD(D0+D) [1− F(D, H)]K and find A¯ ≥ A
at T + with A¯ = αF (1 − ξH )(K + Y ). A¯ is constant at T +. Since we know that H¯
still holds for increased marginal gain or decreased marginal costs, we can reduce Eq.
(38) to
1
r
P0 exp
(
αF
( W0 + ηT +
αD(D0 + D) −
(
1 − ξH
αD(D0 + D)
)
H¯
)
αF
(
1 − ξH
αD(D0 + D)
)
(Y + K )
= θ1θ3 exp(θ3 H¯) (39)
and derive H¯ .
C Numerical solution
To apply the continuation algorithm introduced in Sect. 3 we have to derive the model
dynamics explicitely. For convenience we do not write the time argument t to the
dynamic variables K , H , λK , λH , IK .
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To avoid a positive product caused by two negative factors (1−PF ) and (Y −αK I 2K )
and to ensure that (1 − PF ) ∈ [0, 1] we approximate the term (1 − PF ) with 11+αP PF .
We use the following short notations.
Y (K , L , D) = K α 1
(D0 + D) (40a)
πe(K , D, H, IK ) = 11 + αP PF
[
Y (K , D) − αK I 2K
]
−PF (H, D)F(H, D)K (40b)
PF (H, D) = P0 exp
[
αF
(
W0 + ηt
αD(D0 + D) −
(
1 − ξH
αD(D0 + D)
)
H
)]
(40c)
F(H, D) = 1 − exp
(
− W + ξH H
αD(D0 + D)
)
(40d)
IH (u, H(τ−)) = (θ1 + θ2u) exp(θ3(H(τ−) + u)) (40e)
Note, Eq. (40e) is only used for u strictly positive.
We can summarize the canonical system dynamics for t ∈ (τi−1, τi ) with i ∈
{1, ..., N + 1}.
K˙ = IK − δK K (41a)
H˙ = 0 (41b)
λ˙K = (r + δK )λK − α
1
1+αP PF Y (K , L , D)
K
+ PF (H, D)F(H, D) (41c)
λ˙H = rλH − PF (D, H)αF
(
1 − ξH
αD(D0 + D)
)
[Y (K , D) − αK I 2K − F(D, H)]
+PF (D, H)(1 − F(D, H))
(
ξH
αD(D0 + D)
)
(41d)
I˙K = IK
[
r + δK − α
λK
1
1+αP PF )Y (K , L , D)
K
+ 1
λK
PF (H, D)F(H, D)
+αF
λK
PF (H, D)
1 − PF (H, D)
η
αD(D0 + D)
]
(41e)
Moreover, we rewrite the conditions for the jump points τi with i ∈ {1, ..., N }.
H(τ+i ) − H(τ−i ) − ui = 0 (42a)
λH (τ
+
i ) − (θ˜1 + θ˜2ui ) exp(θ3(H(τ−) + ui )) = 0 (42b)
λH (τ
+
i ) − λH (τ−i ) − (θ˜3 + θ˜2ui ) exp(θ3(H(τ−) + ui )) = 0 (42c)
πe(K (τi ), H(τ+i ), IK (τ
+
i )) − πe(K (τi ), H(τ+i ), IK (τ−i ))
+λK (τ+i )[IK (τ+i ) − δK K (τ+i )] − λK (τ−i )[IK (τ−i ) − δK K (τ−i )]
−r IH (ui , H(τ−i )) = 0 (42d)
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We solve the conditions for every interval assuming 0 < τ1 < τ2 < cdots < τN <
τN+1 = T . The starting values are
K (0) = K0 (43a)
H(0−) = 0 (43b)
and at the end T the transversality conditions have to hold. Note, that here the time
argument for all the dynamic variables is time T .
1
r
[
α
[1 − PF (H, D)]Y (K , D)
K
− PF (H, D)F(H)
]
− λK = 0
(43c)
1
r
PF (H, D)
[
αF
(
1 − ξH
αD(D0 + D)
)
(Y (K , D) − αK I 2K + F(H, D)K )
]
− λH = 0
(43d)
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